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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Free Exercise Clause Prohibits Compulsory Education of Amish Children.
The Amish were founded in the late Seventeenth Century in the
Canton of Bern, Switzerland. Jakob Ammann, a Swiss Anabaptist and
follower of Menno Simons' Mennonites, broke with his church in disagreement over what he believed were unwarranted departures from
traditional Mennonite religious ideology and practices. The Amish,
followers of Ammann, dedicated themselves to uphold the traditional
dogmas by resisting any pressure to succumb to the sin of worldliness.
The Amish came to Pennsylvania from Switzerland in the early
Eighteenth Century, and it is only in North America that their name and
distinctive practices have survived.'
The Old Order is the most traditional and conservative of the
Amish community,' numbering about fifty thousand adults and children in the United States.' There is no distinct secular government in
the Old Order Amish community; therefore, their life is centered
around the church and the church district. Each church district, a
geographical unit, promulgates its own rules of daily life, known as
the Ordnung. The cornerstone of these rules is the belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from
"worldly" influence.4 Next to religion, the most esteemed precept of
Amish life is the family unit. Obedience to parents is a revered theme
in Amish preaching; "as a sacred life principal and means of control."5
Unquestionably, the Amish are a traditional, cohesive, agrarian
society whose religion pervades every aspect of their life. As such,
the pervasive influences of technology and urbanity militate against
their life style. The Amish believe that these corroding influences are
manifest in formal education beyond the eighth grade. They fear
1.
2.

J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY, 38 (1968).
HOSTETLER, 40.

(hereinafter cited as HOSTETLER).

3. HOSTETLER, 80. This figure is based on 1960 statistics.
4. HOSTETLER, 48. Two Biblical passages which emphasize the necessity of separation from the world and epitomize the Amish religious message are: "Be not conformed
to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind that ye may prove
what is good and acceptable and perfect will of God." (Romans 12:1). And "Be not
unequally yoked together with unbelievers .......
(H Corinthians 6:14). Hence, the
Amish reject modem technology, adhering to First Century christian austerity using
windmills and the horse and buggy rather than electricity and the automobile.
5. HOSTETLER, 17.
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that their religious society will dissolve if the values promoted in the
public school system are instilled into their children. 6 This fear is
valid. Justice Stewart once recognized: "A teacher works in a sensitive
area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds
toward the society in which they live." 7 During the pedagogical era
in which compulsory education laws were confined to eight grades of
elementary education carried out in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with
a large portion of the students of the Amish faith, the Old Order
Amish had little basis to fear that school attendance would expose
their children to the worldly influence they reject. However, modern
compulsory secondary education in rural areas now takes place in a
consolidated school." This factor, along with the stringent enforcement of compulsory attendance laws,9 has removed Amish high schoolage children from their sheltered religious society and placed them in
an educational setting at odds with their traditional values and religious
beliefs. Hence, the Amish fear of the eventual dissipation of their
society is now heightened. 10
Regardless of this fear, Amish parents accede to formal education of their children through the eighth grade reasoning that the basic
skills in the "three R's" are necessary in order to read the Bible, be
good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people
when necessary."
High school, however, comes at a time in the life
of the Amish child when isolation is important for the development of
personality within the culture.' 2
Therefore, the Amish have often embarked upon a course of civil
disobedience, resisting the compulsory school laws and invoking
what they feel is a higher command rooted in the tenets of their
faith: "And be not conformed to this world"; "Keep thyself pure."' 3
6.

7.

193.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
HOSTETLER,

8. See, e.g., W.S.A. § 117.06 (1972) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 11-1 (1971).
9. For an excellent history of compulsory education in America and the constitutional issues prevalent therein see Comment, Compulsory Education In The United
States: Big Brother Goes To School, 3 SETON HAL L. REV. 349 (1972).

10. HOSTETLER, 194. And, as the United States Supreme Court recognized: "Formal
high school beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs not only because it
places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing
emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the
styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but because it takes them away from
their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adoles-

cent period of life."
11.

12.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
HOSTETLER,

194.

13. Note, The Right Not To Be Modern Men: The Amish And Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925 (1967).

257

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 4: 256

This civil disobedience crystalized into a constitutional challenge
when Jonas Yoder, Adin Yutzy and Wallace Miller, Amish residing in
Green County, Wisconsin, refused to send their teenage children to
high school. The Wisconsin trial court ordered the three Amish fathers
to send their children to public or private high school until age 16,
in compliance with the State compulsory school attendance law. 14 This
decision was affirmed by the Wisconsin circuit court.' 5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed,'" ruling that application of the compulsory
school attendance law violated Amish rights under the Free Exercise
17
Clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Upon petition of the State, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari'" and resolved the conflict in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 9 The
majority opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, expressing the views of
six members of the Court,2" affirmed the judgment of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, holding that a state's interest in Iformally educating
Amish schoolage children beyond eighth grade is not, by its nature,
sufficient to justify the severe interference with religious freedom such
additional compulsory school attendance would entail. 2 '
The Yoder decision is significant on two levels. In the past, clashes
between the police power of the states to regulate public health, safety
and welfare, and the individual's right to freely exercise his religious
beliefs have been governed by an undefined application of the balanc14.

W.S.A. § 118.15 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
118.15 Compulsory school attendance
(1) (a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school,
any person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and
16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period
and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in
which such child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school
term, quarter or semester of the school year in which he becomes 16 years
of age.****
(5) Whoever violates this section . . . may be fined not less than $5 nor
more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both.
15. The evidence at trial showed that respondents sincerely believed that formal
high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and life style and that respondents would endanger their own salvation and that of their children by complying
with the law. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 433, 182 N.W.2d 539, 541 (1971).
16. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
17. The Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment was held to be applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
18. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 402 U.S. 994 (1971).
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. Justices Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Douglas
filed an opinion dissenting in part. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
21. 402 U.S. at 227. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, agreed with the
majority that the Amish religious claim was sincere. He disagreed, however, with the
majority's refusal to consider the free exercise claims of the children. 402 U.S. at
241-42.
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ing test. In Yoder, the Court has established objective guidelines
within which courts may weigh the competing interests involved, to
determine whether those interests of a state are of sufficient magnitude
to overbalance legitimate free exercise claims. Yoder also reaffirms the
concept that it is the fundamental right of parents, as opposed to the
state, to guide the religious future and education of their children. As
a result, the Court's mandate in Yoder enables the Amish to retain and
strengthen their traditional beliefs and life style.
An understanding of the judicial concepts previously employed by
the Supreme Court to resolve free exercise-state regulation controversies is essential in the analysis of the Yoder Court's rationale.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CONCEPT

22

Neither the States' right to validly exercise their police powers nor
the individual's fundamental right of free exercise have ever been considered absolute. The courts have striven to balance the competing
interests involved whenever they have conflicted. The Supreme Court
made its first pronouncement on the Free Exercise Clause in 1878, in
the case of Reynolds v. United States. 23 There the Court upheld a bigamy conviction of a Mormon who took a second wife in accordance with
the accepted doctrine of his church. Indeed, the defendant believed
that his refusal to practice polygamy would result in his eternal damnation.2 4 The Court found that the first amendment deprived Congress
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but left it free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.2 5 The Court had no doubt that Congress was fit to determine
what were social duties in regard to marriage and the family. The
question facing the Court was whether the practice of polygamy contravened the good of society. The Court stated that from early civilization marriage had been a "sacred obligation", and polygamy an "offense against society." It therefore decided that this type of practice
was never intended to fall within the protection of the first amendment.
To allow such an exception would "make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to become law unto himself."2 6 The Reynold's Court
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
23.
24.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 161.

25.
26.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 167.
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gave no clear test to determine what actions were protected by the
constitutional guarantee. The decision showed, at least, that freedom of
religion is not absolute.
In 1940, the Court clarified the Reynold's rationale in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.2 7 In Cantwell, the defendant, a member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses sect, was convicted for violation of a statute and common
law breach of the peace. While on a busy street corner the defendant had played a phonograph record which attacked all organized religions as instruments of Satan. He did not first obtain a certificate
of approval as required by law. The Court stated that the first amendment's guarantees embrace:
• . . two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly
28
to infringe the protected freedom.
To determine whether the Jehovah's Witness' religious freedom had
been unduly infringed the Court balanced2 9 the two conflicting interests: the individual's freedom of religion and the State's "obvious interest in the preservation and protection of peace and good order within
her borders." 3 The Court, thereupon, reversed the Jehovah's Witness'
conviction, stating that his religious conduct constituted no "clear
and present danger to a substantial interest of the State . . . [or to]
public peace and order. . ... 1 Thus, the Court in Cantwell expressly employed the "clear and present danger" standard in its balanc27. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). At least two academic commentators have cited the
distinction between belief and action as basic to the Court's treatment of the Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., P. Kurland, RELIGION AND THE LAW, 22 (1966); Weiss,
Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YAL-E L.J. 593, 608 (1964).
See also Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
Wis. L. Rv. 217, 233, (hereinafter cited as Galanter).
28. 310 U.S. at 303-304.
29. The term "balancing test" appears to have been coined, or at least most frequently used, by Mr. Justice Black. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 165 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Wilkenson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399, 420 (1961) (dissenting opinion). The balancing test has been aptly
described by the Court of Appeals of New York:
We balance, then, the interest of the individual right of religious worship
against the interest of the state which is sought to be enforced. The process of
balancing is twofold: first, a determination of whether a restriction will be
thus imposed on the individual's freedom of worship; and secondly, a determination whether the presence of a restriction is justified after, a consideration of
the social and constitutional issues involved.
People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (1966).
30. 310 U.S. at 307.
31. Id. at 311.
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ing process. 2 The appropriateness of the standard, however, caused
consistent division of the Court in the free exercise-state regulation
cases that followed.
3 a case heavily reIn Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,"
lied upon by the State in Yoder, the Court affirmed the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for violation of the state's child labor laws. The
defendant was the legal guardian of her nine year old niece, and both
believed it to be their religious duty to publicly distribute Jehovah's
Witnesses literature on the street and from door to door. 4 The case
presented a distinct conflict between religious freedom and the State's
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children. In their
balancing process, five members of the Court refused to apply the clear
and present danger standard advocated by the defendant. The majority's language is elusive. It may imply either that that standard has
no application when the welfare of children is involved, or that the
state's burden of proving any immediate danger is easily sustained in
such a case:
We think that with reference to the public proclaiming of religion,
upon the streets and in other similar public places, the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope
of its authority over adults. . . and the rightful boundary of power
35
has not been crossed in this case.

The majority clearly held high regard for the duties of the state as
parens patriae. The dissent, however, thought the majority had unjustifiably departed from established standards:
If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to
be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing
proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate6 dan3
ger to the state or the health, morals or welfare of the child.
Prince was the last major free exercise case until 1961 when the
Court handed down its decision in Braunfield v. Brown.17 In Braunfield, one of the four Sunday Closing cases,"' the Court upheld a Pennsylvania criminal statute which proscribed Sunday retail sales of cer32. The Cantwell balancing of interests rationale was the contemporary genesis of
the present day balancing test. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
34. Id. at 171.
35. Id. at 170.
36. id. at 164.
37. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
38. Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Two Guys and McGowan did not involve free exercise claims; and the religion claims
in Gallagher are substantially similar to those put forth in Braunfield.
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tain commodities. The petitioners, Orthodox Jewish merchants, argued that the Sunday closing law unconstitutionally interfered with their
free exercise of religion by subjecting their religious practices to severe
economic burdens; because they had to close their shops on Sunday as
well as on Saturday, which was required by their religion. The Court
noted that one's right to freely exercise religious actions, 39 as well as
a state's exercise of its police power are not absolute.40 And to determine which interest weighed less, the Court again by-passed the clear
and present danger standard in its balancing process:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one
or all religions . . . that law is constitutionally invalid even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if
the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless a State may accomplish
its purpose by
41
means which do not impose such a burden.
By directing attention to the "effects" as well as the purposes of the
law, the Court initiated a requirement to evaluate the impact of the
statutory regulation upon the religious practice, no matter how indirect the harm.42 Nevertheless, the Court in Braunfield viewed the impact of the Sunday closing law as merely making the Jewish merchants'
"practice of their religious beliefs more expensive," and, therefore,
insufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate statutory regulation.43 Furthermore, the Court implemented what has become known
as the "no alternative means" requirement, i.e., are there alternative
means available to satisfy the permissible state interest? The majority
in Braunfield saw none, therefore approving the Pennsylvania statute.
Three Justices dissented. They emphasized the honored place of
religious freedoms in the Constitutional hierarchy:
[First amendment freedoms] are susceptible of restriction only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state
may lawfully protect . . . this exacting standard has been consistently applied by this Court as the test of legislation under all clauses
of the First Amendment. .... 44
Just two years after skirting the clear and present danger standard in
Braunfield, the Court expressly employed the standard in Sherbert v.
39.

366 U.S. at 603.

40.
41.

Id. at 607.
Id.

42.

Prior to Braunfield, it was sufficient for the Court to determine that the

purpose or object of the law was properly secular.

43.
44.

262

See, e.g., Galanter, at 239.

366 U.S. at 605.
366 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Verner.4 5 Sherbert represented the dawn of the new day for religious
freedom claims. There, the Court sustained a Seventh Day Adventist's
claim for unemployment compensation even though she had refused
employment and thereby did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
Her refusal was grounded on her religious beliefs which prohibited Saturday work. The Court distinguish Reynolds, Prince, and Braunfield on the ground that the conduct or actions regulated in those cases
"posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order."46
The Court enunciated a bifurcated test for determining free exercisestate regulation conflicts: first, it must be found that the state regulation involved infringes upon the individual's free exercise guarantee. 47 Then the Court must determine whether some "compelling
state interest" is advanced to justify the infringement of first amendment rights. 48 The Court explained what the State must prove to establish that its interest is compelling:
[N] o showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional
area, "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation. .... -49
Therefore, with the reaffirmation of the exacting standard of a clear
and present danger, the Sherbert Court saw no such abuse or danger
to the state's unemployment compensation fund present to justify the
statute's impingement on the Sabbatarian's religious freedom.
Reynolds, Prince, Braunfield and Sherbert indicate the Supreme
Court's inconsistency in its employment of an appropriate standard to
be applied in free exercise cases. The Court's failure to establish pre45.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 403.
Id.
Id.

49. Id. at 406 (emphasis added), quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945). Two decisions which have relied on Sherbert support a broad reading of
the case. In In re Jenison the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the contempt conviction of a lady who refused jury duty because rendering judgment on other persons
violated her religious beliefs. 265 Minn. 96, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1963). On appeal the
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case "in light
of Sherbert v. Verner." 375 U.S. 14 (1963). On rehearing, the conviction was reversed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the State's interest in having an available
pool of jurors was not so compelling to justify the burden on Mrs. Jenison's free
exercise of religion. 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
In People v. Woody, the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a
member of the Native American Church for unauthorized possession of the hallucinogen,
peyote. The defendant successfully argued that the use of peyote was central to his
religious beliefs. The state failed to show a compelling interest in stopping this sect
from possessing or using the drug. Nor could the state show that an exception to the
statute would seriously subvert attempts at general enforcement of an otherwise permissible statute. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). The clear
and present danger standard was utilized in both Jenison and Woody.
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cise guidelines in these cases has deprived individuals and the states of
an advance notion of their respective possibilities of ultimate success.
It has also deprived the lower ',courts of that guidance necessary to
impart predictability and coherence into their decisions. 50 Furthermore, although the Court in Sherbert utilized the clear and present danger standard and its concomitant "compelling state interest" test, that
test has been criticized as being elusive and ambiguous. 5 ' It is within
the perspective of this constitutional no-man's land that the Supreme
Court's decision in Yoder is chiefly significant.
Wisconsin v. Yoder: GUIDELINES-THE AMISH CLAIM
Mr. Chief Justice Burger gave a brief but comprehensive history
of the Amish and their social and religious traditions to lay the groundwork for the delicate balancing task ahead. The Chief Justice first recognized the maxim that the states' police powers are not absolute;
noting that however highly a state's interest in universal education is
ranked, "it is not totally free from a balancing process" when it impinges upon a parent's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs
through the spiritual guidance of his child. 52 The Court expressly followed the bifurcated approach set forth in Sherbert:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance
beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must
appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.53
The Court did not, however, use the Sherbert language of "compelling
state interest" when it described what interests of the state will outweigh the individual's free exercise claim:
The essence of all that has been said or written on the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
54
of religion.
50. Clark, Guidelines For the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 329330 (1969). See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968); Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
51. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and The Old Order Amish: A
Commentary On State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REV.423 (1968); Note, The Right Not To
Be Modern Men: The Amish And Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).
See also 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307 (1963); 49 IowA L. REv. 952 (1964); 43 ORE.
L. REv. 177 (1964); 10 VIL. L. Rav. 337 (1965); 5 VALp. U. L. REv. 666 (1971).
52. 406 U.S. at 214.
53. Id. (emphasis added).

54.

406 U.S. at 215. (emphasis added).
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Hence, the Court retained the no alternative means requirement which
was established in Braunfield. The Court's description of the State's
interests as being "of the highest order" is not, however, analogous to
the term "compelling" as used in Sherbert. When the Yoder Court
substituted its "highest order" qualification in place of "compelling",
it implicitly rejected the application of the clear and present danger
standard which was inherent in that concept as used in Sherbert. The
Court stated:
This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order
or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred.
The record is to the contrary, and any reliance on that theory [by
the State] would find no support in the evidence. 5
Therefore, the Court could have immediately disposed of the issue by
utilizing the Sherbert "compelling state interest" test, requiring the
State to show some immediate danger to its interests.5 6 The Yoder
Court preferred a more objective approach in its balancing process;
it therefore formulated judicial guidelines to enable it to weigh the
competing interests involved. These guidelines are partially interwoven in the Amish claim.
A qualitative analysis of the Amish fathers' free exercise claim caused
the Court to find that the claim was not spurious; their beliefs were
sincere. 7 The record clearly showed, and Wisconsin did not deny,5"
that the Amish mode of life and education are inseparable from the
basic tenets of their religion. 59 The majority emphasized that transportation to the consolidated high school removed the Amish children from their church centered community for a substantial portion
of their formative years. The conclusion was "inescapable": Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law contravened the basic religious
tenets and practice of the Amish faith "by exposing Amish children
to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary
to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child. .
"...
0 In conclusion, the Court noted that
55. Id. at 230.
56. The Wisconsin Supreme Court employed the Sherbert compelling interest test.
State v. Yoder, 49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
57. 406 U.S. at 219. A determination of the sincerity of a claimant's religious
belief is a difficult but indispensable task in all free exercise cases. See, United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C.
App. 1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting).
58. 406 U.S. at 219.
59. Id. at 216.
60. Id. at 218.
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the impact of the contested statute "would gravely endanger if not
destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs."'"
The significance, therefore, of the Court's evaluation of the "quality", i.e., legitimacy, of the Amish free exercise claim centered on two
guidelines: first, the sincerity62 and importance of the religious practice infringed upon by the statute; and second, the impact, or degree
to which the contested statutory regulation interfered with the religious
practice. 63 Having found an infringement upon fundamental rights, it
was necessary for the Court to weigh the State's interests.
THE STATE'S INTEREST:
WISE SERVED?"

"OF THE HIGHEST ORDER AND NOT OTHER-

The Court moved with great circumspection in weighing the interests Wisconsin sought to promote by its compulsory attendance law.
Wisconsin, of course, argued that its interests in compulsory education
were "so compelling" that the established Amish religious practices
must give way. 4 The Court, however, refused to accept this argument because fundamental rights of religious freedom were involved.
Instead, the Court closely examined the three underlying values served
by the State's promotion of compulsory school attendance. First, to
"prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system." ' 5 Second, to enable "individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." 6 Finally, and singularly applicable to the Amish, to better prepare any potential Amish
67
defectors for life in non-Amish society.
Upon analysis of this third underlying value, the Court found that
there was no specific evidence of a loss of Amish adherents by attrition.6 8 The Court did not take judicial notice of the fact that a signifi61.

Id. at 219.

62. See, cases cited supra note 56.
63. It cannot be stressed enough that daily living itself represents religious practice
for the Amishman: "Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades the
entire mode of life of its adherents." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
64. 406 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). The Court readily disposed of two minor
contentions argued by Wisconsin. First, using the "belief-action" rationale, Wisconsin
argued that since the Amish were being prosecuted for their "actions" in refusing to
send their children to the public high school, the first amendment protections were
inapplicable, even though such actions were religiously grounded. Second, Wisconsin
unsuccessfully contended that the statute has a secular purpose and does not, on its
face, discriminate against religions; therefore, it should withstand constitutional attack.
406 U.S. at 219-20.
65. 406 U.S. at 221.
66.
67.
68.

266

Id.
Id. at 224.
Id.
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cant number of Amish children do eventually leave the Old Order. 9
The Court did, however, accept as valid and important the two other
values underlying the State's interest in compulsory school attendance,
preservation of the democratic political system and economic survival.
Nevertheless, by careful analysis of these values, the Court found that
"one or two years of formal high school . . . would do little to serve
these interests."7 Instead, the Court assessed the value of education,
as applied to the Amish, in terms of its capacity to prepare the child
for living in a separated agrarian community that is the foundation of
the Amish faith. 7 ' This assessment, together with the expert testimony at trial that the Amish "system of learning-by-doing was an 'ideal
system' of education in terms of preparing Amish children for life as
adults in the Amish community,"7 2 led the Court to conclude:
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them to . . . [fulfill] the social and political responsibilities
of citizenship without compelled attendance beyond the eighth
grade3 at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief.7
Indeed, the Court saw no impediment 74 to the State's interests by exempting the Amish from the statutory regulation. The interests were
being otherwise served by the Amish method of learning-by-doing.
Essentially, the Court's examination of the State's interest in compelling school attendance to age 16 focused on three guidelines:
first, the importance of the secular values underlying the statutory regulation; second, whether those values could be effectively served by an
alternative means; and third, the impact that an exemption for religious reasons would have on the interests promoted by the statute.7 By weighing the State's interests in compulsory school attendance
within this framework, the Court implicitly concluded that those
interests were of the "highest order; ' 76 and expressly concluded
69. 406 U.S. at 244-45 and n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. 406 U.S. at 222.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id. at 225.
74. To determine whether any impediment to a state's interest will flow from
exempting an individual from the operation of the statute, the Court has traditionally
considered such factors as expense and administrative convenience, and interference with
implementation of public policy. See Galanter at 280-82.
75. 'See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part 1. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967).

76.

See concurring opinion of Justice White with whom Justices Brennan and

Stewart joined, at 238:
The importance of the state interest asserted here cannot be denigrated, how-

ever:

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and

local governments.

Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
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that they could be obtained by an alternative means which would not
jeopardize the Amish fathers' right to freely exercise their religious beliefs. The State simply failed to prove with enough particularity that
its interests were sufficient to justify the substantial infringement on
religious freedom caused by such additional compulsory attendance."7
The first and fourteenth amendments, therefore, prevent the State from
compelling Amish parents to cause their children to attend formal high
school at age 16.78
THE REAFFIRMATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The Court's consideration of the rights of Amish children was strictly
ancillary to the main issue of the fundamental interest of parents, as
opposed to that of the State, to guide the religious education
of their children. The Court could not focus upon the children's
religious freedom because the Amish fathers asserted only their own
free exercise rights.7 9 They alone were being prosecuted for refusing to cause their children to attend school; the children were
not parties to the litigation."0 The Court has traditionally believed that
the religious freedoms of parent and child coincide."' Therefore, the
Yoder Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
contravened "the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith,
82
both as to the parent and the child.
Education of children, however, unlike religious guidance, is not
within the exclusive domain of parental discretion. It is axiomatic that
States have a legitimate interest in requiring that their school age citizens receive a proper secular education. The Yoder decision is thus
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S 483, 493 (1954).

77.
78.

79.
80.

406 U.S. at 227.
Id., at 234.

See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961).
406 U.S. at 230. As a matter of federal jurisdiction, a litigant may only assert

his own constitutional rights or immunities.

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22

(1960).
The Wisconsin compulsory school attendance statute requires that a parent shall be
proceeded against first for failure to cause his child to attend school. If the parent
can show, as a defense, his inability to compel the child to attend school, he is discharged and the child will be prosecuted as a truant. See In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 182
N.W. 360 (1921).
81. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 212-38 (1947)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Galanter, at 284-88.
82.
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vulnerable to the critical challenge of neglecting the educational rights
of Amish children.A But the Court was not confronted with a clash
pitting the Amish parents against their children and the state as parens patriae. This conflict could arise if Amish parents prevent their
children from attending formal high school despite the children's
demands to attend. Such a situation would thrust the issue of the
Amish children's educational rights and interests directly before the
Court. This potential clash would be significant in light of recent decisions placing the right to equal education within the category of
"fundamental interests." 4 The decision in Serrano v. Priest8 5 illustrates this trend. In Serrano, the California Supreme Court struck
down its State's property taxation scheme for funding public elementary and secondary schools as violative of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection mandate. The California court held that the method of
funding made a child's education dependent upon the wealth of his
community; those in poorer districts are unconstitutionally discriminated against. 6 The court viewed education as a fundamental right
to which conditions dependent on wealth may not be applied. The
United States Supreme Court will soon decide whether the right to an
equal education is fundamental."7 If the Court decides that it is, an
extremely delicate constitutional conflict could arise within the Amish
community in light of Yoder: the Amish parent's right of freedom of
religion and parental authority vs. the child's fundamental right to
equal education. Based upon the express attitude of the Court in
Yoder, it is highly probable that the parent's rights would prevail:
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. 8
The Yoder Court did not totally ignore the Amish children's educational interests which were inherent within their fathers' free exer83. See Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 832, 849; 5 VALP. U. L. REV. 666 (1971); 56 MINN. L. REV.
111 (1971); 24 VAND. L. REV. 810 (1971); 47 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1972); 17 S. D. L.
REV. 251 (1972).
84. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 484 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
Prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972) (No. 71-1332); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
85. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 484 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
86. 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
87. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972) (No.71-1332).

88.

406 U.S. at 232.
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cise claim. The Court implicitly recognized that the children deserved
some element of standardized education beyond the eighth grade when
it concluded that there was:
[N] o basis for assuming that . . . reasonable standards cannot be
of the continuing vocational edestablished concerning the content
s9
ucation of the Amish children.
Although the State is not, therefore, entirely divorced from the
post-elementary education of the Amish children, its control is decimated. As such, the Yoder Court reaffirmed the concept of a parental charter of rights established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters:9"
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 91
This parental charter is not, however, absolute. The Yoder Court
stated that if it were ever to appear that Amish parental decisions
will jeopardize "the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens," the power of the parent, even when
coupled to a free exercise claim, may be subject to state limitations."
The Court drew a sharp line between giving the state power to punish
specific identifiable abuses of children by their parents, and elevating
the state to a socializing role equal to that of the parents. The former
has always been recognized as a justifiable exercise of the state's police
power to protect the welfare of the child and society. 93 As the Yoder
decision illustrates, the latter runs against the entire notion of the
family and the individual as the basic unit of democracy.
Within the Court's reaffirmation of the parental right to guide the religious upbringing and education of their children lies the impetus for
the internal strengthening of the Amish society. Yoder will enable
the Amish to more effectively resist the exertion of contemporary
society's "hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards." 9 '
In a historical and sociological perspective, the Yoder decision serves
as a watershed in Amish history. Amish opposition to compulsory
89. Id., at 236. Several other states have enacted statutory compromises to the
Amish education controversy, e.g., IowA CODE § 299.24 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-1111 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1330(4) (Supp. 1971).
90. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
91. Id., at 535.
92. See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
93. 406 U.S. at 233-34. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1924);
People v. Labernz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 842
(1952) (Jehovah's Witnesses blood transfusion case); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination for school children).
94. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217.
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education is no stranger in American case law. Various state courts
have repeatedly upheld the police power of the States to require
Amish children to attend formal schools.9 5 The Court's decision in Yoder, however, cuts at the heart of all prior lower court decisions adverse to the Amish. The Yoder Court highly regarded the essential
role of dissent in American democratic society, and recognized the
Amish's right to separate themselves from the "mainstream" by shielding and strengthening their religious traditions and life style within
their cohesive agrarian community:
There can be no assumption that today's majority is "right" and
the Amish and others like them are "wrong". A way of life that
is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned because it is different.9 6
In its broadest reading, Yoder stands for the postulate that state
establishment of values, like the establishment of religion,9 7 is a threat
to the tenets set down by the Bill of Rights.9"
The Court's decision in Yoder does not, however, support a broad
application for exempting all minority groups from compulsory education for religious reasons.9 9 It does impart the objective guidelines
necessary to thoroughly balance the competing interests present in all
free exercise cases. For this reason, Yoder represents a marked departure from the Court's undefined and inconsistent approach in
Reynolds, Prince, Braunfield and Sherbert. The Court's careful omis95. Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951); State v.
Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); State v. Garber, 197 Kan.

567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967); Casad, Compulsory High
School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16
KAN. L. REV. 432 (1968).

96. 406 U.S. at 223-24.
97. The Supreme Court clearly stated that its decision recognizing an exemption for
the Amish from the State's system of compulsory education did not constitute an
impermissible establishment of religion:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no
matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right
of free exercise. By preserving doctrinal flexibiltiy and recognizing the need
for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses "we have been
able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious
bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a tight
rope and one we have successfully traversed." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 672.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21. See also 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 n.22.
98. Arons, Compulsory Education: The Plain People Resist, SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan.
15, 1972 p. 52.

99. The Court stated: "It cannot be over-emphasized that we are not dealing with
a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered
some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children in modem life."
406 U.S. at 235.
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sion of "compelling state interest" and "clear and present danger"
language may indicate its reluctance to be confined to such ambiguous
phrases when deciding these cases. The Yoder approach should
more readily enable consistent judicial determination of whether a
state's interest are "of the highest order and not otherwise served,"
when promotion of those interests runs head-on into legitimate free
exercise claims.
EDWARD J. WALSH, JR.

